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In system development, epistemic uncertainty is an ever-present possibility when reasoning about the 
causal factors during hazard analysis. Such uncertainty is common when complicated systems interact 
with one another, and it is dangerous because it impairs hazard analysis and thus increases the chance 
of overlooking unsafe situations. Uncertainty around causation thus needs to be managed well. 
Unfortunately, existing hazard analysis techniques tend to ignore unknown uncertainties, and system 
stakeholders rarely track known uncertainties well through the system lifecycle. In this paper, we 
outline an approach to managing epistemic uncertainty in existing hazard analysis techniques by 
focusing on known and unknown uncertainty. We have created a reference populated with a wide 
range of safety-critical causal relationships to recognise unknown uncertainty, and we have developed 
a model to systematically capture and track known uncertainty around such factors. We have also 
defined a process for using the reference and model to assess possible causal factors that are suspected 
during hazard analysis. To assess the applicability of our approach, we have analysed the widely-used 
MoDAF architectural model and determined that there is potential for our approach to identify 
additional causal factors that are not apparent from individual MoDAF views. We have also reviewed 
an existing safety assessment example (the ARP4761 Aircraft System analysis) and determined that 
our approach could indeed be incorporated into that process. We have also integrated our approach 
into the STPA hazard analysis technique to demonstrate its feasibility to incorporate into existing 
techniques. It is therefore plausible that our approach can increase safety assurance provided by 
hazard analysis in the face of epistemic uncertainty. 
 
Keywords: Safety assurance, causal factors, epistemic uncertainty, socio-technical systems, hazard 
analysis 
1. Introduction  
Imagine a safety meeting among safety engineers, project managers and operators to evaluate the 
hazards affecting a system prior a flight trial. The operators raised a concern as to whether equipment 
item X could operate in a certain flight profile. Unfortunately, the information was not available. The 
equipment working procedures, which were provided during the design phase, did not include any 
operating specifications. While the project managers knew that the equipment operating specifications 
were missing, they did not anticipate that this absence required further attention after the design phase. 
The project managers thus did not follow up on this uncertainty. Separately, a junior engineer at the 
end of the table was concerned with possible distraction during the flight trial as the pilot needs to 
carry out multiple tasks during the flight, which was not considered during the safety meeting. Being 
inexperienced, he was unsure if such distraction could be safety-critical, so decided to remain quiet 
and not raise the issue.  
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To perform comprehensive safety analysis, we must be able to make timely and accurate 
predictions about potential hazards. Such prediction is based upon the collective wisdom and 
experiences of the people involved, as well as the best information available at the time of conducting 
the assessment. In a meeting like the one above, plausible-but-uncertain predictions or concerns may 
end up being discarded and ignored rather than captured and tracked. The aim of our work is to 
investigate if more can be done to track such uncertainty and provide better prediction regarding 
potential hazard during system development.  
As part of the safety assurance for complicated socio-technical system (STS) [1], system 
stakeholders (which include multiple parties such as safety engineers, project managers, system 
managers and operators) capture safety-critical causal relationship so as to derive the causes of 
hazards. Hazards can be identified from causal relationships among entities, states, behaviours and 
events that are related to the system, to its surroundings, and to other systems in the STS. In this paper, 
we will refer to all such things as “objects”. Examples of such hazards include components failure, 
unsafe human behaviour, unexpected software interaction, incorrect or insufficient safety practice and 
undesired change in external environment. 
As with other activities which depend on abstractions of the real-world, hazard analysis will be 
affected by uncertainty. Uncertainty can be classified as aleatory or epistemic [2] – while aleatory 
uncertainty is random, epistemic uncertainty is due to a lack of knowledge. Our epistemic uncertainty 
can be due to issues we know we do not know (known uncertainties), or issues we do not know we do 
not know (unknown uncertainties) [3]. Although some epistemic uncertainty is unavoidable, we can 
minimise its undesired effects by improving the ways we manage both known and unknown 
uncertainties during hazard analysis. In Section 2, we elaborate on the problems of conducting hazard 
analysis under epistemic uncertainty. Section 3 presents our approach of capturing and tracking such 
uncertainty. In Section 4, we discuss the applicability of our approach. Finally, we describe the 
conclusion and future work in Section 5. 
2. Issues with Epistemic Uncertainty in Hazard Analysis 
In system development, epistemic uncertainty is an ever-present possibility when reasoning about 
the causal factors during hazard analysis. Such uncertainty is common when complicated systems 
interact with one another, and it is dangerous because it impairs hazard analysis and thus increases the 
chance of overlooking unsafe situations. Unfortunately, the problem due to uncertainty is compounded 
as existing hazard analysis techniques tend to ignore unknown uncertainties, and stakeholders 
involved in system development rarely track known uncertainties well through the system lifecycle. 
2.1. Epistemic Uncertainty is Risky    
Epistemic uncertainty in hazard analysis has a high risk of causing unsafe situations since it is 
common (i.e. high probability of occurrence throughout the lifecycle) and dangerous (i.e. severe 
enough to be safety-critical). We shall elaborate further on both observations. 
 Common.  The occurrence of epistemic uncertainty is high and unavoidable throughout a 
system’s lifecycle. For example, during design phase, specifications and requirements may 
not be well defined. During acquisition phase, multiple project teams and stakeholders with 
different vested interest may lead to unexpected behaviours. During operation, a system may 
require to operate either with other systems or in an environment which has not been 
considered before. All the above are possible scenarios that can result in uncertainty 
throughout the system lifecycle.  
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 Dangerous.  The presence of epistemic uncertainty can be severed enough to affect hazard 
analysis. Uncertainty can cause inaccurate assessment as decision makers are presented with 
incomplete information. Such inaccurate analysis for safety-critical system can overlook 
failure or risky scenarios that may result in death, injury or damage to property. In addition, 
uncertainty can also delay safety assessment when relevant information is not available at 
time of analysis. 
2.2. Ignorance of Unknown Uncertainty  
While stakeholders acknowledge the existence of unknown uncertainty, they tend to ignore it and 
focus on what they are aware of from their collective wisdom and experiences regarding uncertainty, 
that is, the known uncertainty. This is understandable during system development as there is a pressure 
to perform within limited resources. Stakeholders have to make risk assessment under a myriad of 
known uncertainties due to a lack of time, expertise and information necessary to make a good 
judgement. Given the limited resources, the assessment would tend to be focusing only on what is 
already known about the uncertainties.   
However, not having the capacity to focus on unknown uncertainty does not mean unknown 
uncertainty is not safety-critical. We want to help stakeholders to recognise such unknown uncertainty 
by creating an abstract structure that encompasses possible safety-critical causal relationships for 
people to specify what they know and what they don’t know. This is akin to the ‘observability-in-
depth’ principle under system safety [4] to identify hazards. The principle advises stakeholders to scan 
the horizon for possible scenario that can transit a system to an increasingly hazardous state. In our 
work, we want to shift the boundary between knowing and not knowing about epistemic uncertainty, 
by surfacing previously unknown uncertainty during hazard analysis.  
2.3. Lack of Tracking of Known Uncertainty 
Even when there is uncertainty that we are aware of, there is still a possibility to ignore and not 
track it. Such information may be discarded because it could be deemed unimportant at the time it was 
acquired. However, uncertainty regarding any given system element can vary over time as the 
developer’s knowledge about the system and its environment changes throughout the system lifecycle. 
Uncertainty can vary depending on the level of abstraction that the information is being presented. The 
more general the information, the greater the uncertainty. Uncertainty can also vary depending on the 
level of control over the system behaviour. There will be more certainties regarding a system being 
developed, compared to an external system or the environment that we have less control and 
knowledge about.  
A system that is deemed simple and predictable during design phase may become complicated 
and uncertain when it starts to interact more with other systems. Also, some uncertainties need time 
before we can determine if they are safety critical. For example, there could be preliminary documents 
with uncertainties about operational concepts, requirements and design features that can only be 
validated in the later stage of a system development. If we do not track such uncertainties, we may end 
up losing information that may turn out to be safety-critical later. Currently, we have few or no ways 
of systematically and efficiently track plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships. We need a feasible 
and practical process to manage such uncertainty as a part of hazard analysis.  
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3. Our Approach to Manage Epistemic Uncertainty  
In this section, we describe a reference, a model and a process that we have introduced to manage 
uncertainty. We have created a reference populated with a wide range of safety-critical causal 
relationships found in the literature to help recognise unknown uncertainty; and we have developed a 
model to systematically capture and track known uncertainty around such factors. We have also 
defined a process for using the reference and model to assess possible causal relationships during 
hazard analysis. 
3.1. Reference of Causal Paths to Recognise Unknown Uncertainty  
In safety analysis, it is expected that stakeholders may not be aware of all causal paths. Hence, 
we want to help them recognise causal paths that are safety-critical even though they may not have full 
knowledge about these causal paths. There is a lot of understanding of the nature of causal 
relationships from collective wisdom. In the spirit of good safety engineering practice, we want to 
harness the maximum effect of prior knowledge about credible causal paths. This motivates us to 
develop a guide to recognise plausible causal paths. Having a reference of causal factors and causal 
paths (we will define both of these terms in the next section) can help decision makers to identify 
potential hazards that can lead to unsafe situation.  
To create a credible reference, we have conducted an extensive literature review of more than 30 
different topics that are related to safety. While the reference cannot claim to be complete, it provides 
a sufficient coverage of diverse issues to help stakeholders recognise a wide range of safety-critical 
concerns. We have observed that as each field of study is specific to one domain within safety, none of 
them can serves as an isolated guide to discover all types of hazards. For example, Shappel’s Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) [5] provides a detailed review of issues related 
to human such as complacency, distraction and confusion; but does not focus on technology issues 
that can also cause uncertainty. His work can be complemented by O'Halloran’s taxonomy of Failure 
Mode/Mechanisms Distribution (FMD) [6] that lists the possible safety-critical issues resulted from 
technical properties such as kinetic, chemical and electrical. In a different study, Endsley’s taxonomy 
of situation awareness error [7] focuses on information and decision making, which provides another 
dimension of causal factors.  
In our literature review, we started by identifying potential causal paths that may result in unsafe 
situations. These causal paths covered a wide range of topics such as system safety, human factor 
ergonomic, project uncertainty, taxonomy of safety-related subjects and situational awareness. From 
the list of causal paths and the suggested classifications within the literature, we have consolidated the 
causal paths into six primary causal factors: Human, Organisation, Technology, Process, Information 
and Environment. Table 1 provides a summary of the causal factors and the associated causal paths. 
Each of the causal factors can be further divided into two or three secondary causal factors 
(highlighted bold in Table 1).  
The danger of over-reliance on a checklist should be emphasised here. The checklist can serve as 
a guide to provide reference and direction for stakeholders to recognise potential causal paths that 
affect safety. These will not be the only possible causal paths that can occur in a causal relationship. 
More importantly, the approach of considering and recognising plausible causal paths helps to shift 
these causal paths from being unknown uncertainty (e.g. not knowing the existence of a causal path) to 
known uncertainty (e.g. not having full knowledge about a causal path). This awareness of known 
uncertainty is better for the safety assessment than the initial state of not recognising that the plausible 
causal path exists. 
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Causal Factors Causal Paths 
Human H1: Manpower – expertise[8-10] staffing[5, 8, 10-14] mix[12] ownership[8] experience[8, 12] leadership[5, 15] skill[5, 10, 12, 13, 16-18] ability[12] 
characters[19] individualistic[20] demographic[20] cultural[20] obligation[21] survivable[12] stakeholders[10, 22-25] user[26] turnover[10] education[10] 
H2: Mental state – escalation[15] brokerage[15] free rider[15] convention[15] norm[15] selective benefit[15] morale and motivation [10, 12, 15] social[18, 
27] deliberate[16] esteem[21] complacency[5] stress[5] overconfidence[5] fatigue[5] distraction[5, 7] confusion[5] health[12] comfort[12] visual limitation[5] 
illness[5] injury[12] disability[12] hearing limitation[5] cognitive[12] physical[12, 28] sensory[12] team dynamic[12, 13] aptitude[12] emotional[28]  
H3: Action – operation[9] network[15] broadcast[15] rumour[15] communication[5, 8, 10, 13] open[13] interrelation[13] atmosphere[13] engagement[29] 
coordination[5] omission[7, 16] commission[16] extraneous act[16] observation[19] interpretation[19] overcommit[21] performance slip[31] specification 
slip[31] lapse-forgot[31] lapse-overlook[31] rest[5] preparation[5] intentional violation[13, 18, 32] behaviour[29] lack involvement[10] influence[30] 
Organisation O1: Management – supervision[5, 9, 15] audit[15] communication[19] structure [5, 19, 23, 30, 33] levels of domain[30] role ambiguity and conflict[20] 
schedule[20] demand[21] feedback and refine[5] company[14] project size[10] project uniqueness[10] project density[10] 
O2: Policy – regulation and control[14, 15, 22, 30] job future and security[20, 21], culture and climate[5, 10, 17, 20, 33, 34] reward and recognition[20, 21] 
incompatible goals[10, 13, 32] trade-off[13] ambiguous goal[10] narrow goal[10] expectation[10] customer satisfaction[26] 
O3: Resource – training facility[9, 15, 19, 26, 32] material[8, 9, 17] supplier management[10, 15, 25] support facility[5, 10, 16, 26, 28] time phase[11, 16] time 
step[11, 16] project urgency[10] allocation[5] monetary[5, 10] instructional[12] unrealistic time frame[10] outsource management[10] interdependent  
Technology T1: Machine – hardware capability[9, 11, 18, 22, 25, 30, 32, 33] hardware compatibility[34] technical[23, 27, 35] equipment [5, 16, 19] interface[5, 19] 
link[18] node[18] display[5] construction[17] software[6, 11, 18, 22, 25, 30, 33, 34] communication[6, 26, 32] engineering[24] mobility[18] traffic[18] area 
coverage[18] services[26] tool[26] technique[26] abstraction[8] working range[8] tech change[8, 10] innovation[8] complexity[5] availability[13] function[13]  
T2: Property – energy[11] kinetic[8] biological[8] acoustical[8] chemical[8] electrical[8] mechanical[8] electro-magnetic[8] thermal[8] radiation[6, 8] 
bonding[6] buckling[6] change in property[6] corrosion[6] cracking[6] deformation[6] fatigue[6] seizure[6] impact[6] rupture[6] voiding[6] wear[6, 34] 
breakdown[6] contamination[6] diffusion[6] degradation[6] incorrect current[6] punch through[6] leak[34] loose[34] drift[34] synchronisation[34] 
T3: Support – system design[17, 32] tool design[20] tool usability[20] work area design[20] task design[5, 32] medium[18] 
Process P1: Nature – segregation[8] systematic[8] oversight[5, 8] procedure [5, 8, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 22, 32-34] practice[8, 22] overload[7, 20] control[11, 20] 
autonomy[20, 28] repetitiveness[20, 30] feedback[20, 28] ability to learn[20] input[11] output[11] lower level failure[18] cascade failure[18] delay[18] 
P2: Phase – design and plan[19, 35] validation[8] verification[8] manufacturing[24] operation[24] risk management[8, 10, 12, 32] review[8] maintenance[13, 
32, 34, 35] housekeeping[32] inspection[35] supervision[35] work[14, 26, 27, 33] training[13, 16] execution and operation[5, 16, 26, 34] mis-operation[16] 
task[20, 23, 25] sense-making[26] decision making[26] thinking[26] 
Information I1: Knowledge – procedure[9] standard[9] method[9] assumption[16] policy[5, 25] rule[17, 22] guideline[11] precondition[11] type of info[19] manual and 
checklist[5] protocol[13, 18] roles and responsibilities[10] best practice[10] data[10] concept[10] no fault found[34] rationalities[30] evidence[30] values[30] 
fluctuation[30] customer requirements[26] codified information[26] 
I2: Error – application error[31] assumption error[31] syntax error[31] requirement error[31] lack of distinction[31] lack of awareness[31] insufficient 
knowledge[31] situational awareness error[13] incomplete specification[10] conflicting requirements[10] info processing problem[10, 26] data unavailable[7]  
Environment E1: Physical – transport network[15] ambient condition[16, 19] weather[5, 16] orientation[16] size[16] location[16] elevation[16] operating condition[12, 19] 
noise[5, 20] lighting[5, 20] vibration[5, 20] pollution[20] heat[5] terrestrial[18] meteorological[18] cosmological[18] 
E2: Non-physical – cultural[9, 26, 33] social[22] attitude[9] economic[10, 15, 18, 22, 33] competitiveness[26] political[10, 15, 18, 22, 25, 33] regulatory[26, 33] 
legal[10, 22] contract[15] propaganda[15] duration[16] delayed[16] alternative[21] strategic interest[21] government[14] complexity[10] security[18] 
Table 1. Reference of causal factors and causal paths 
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3.2. Model to Capture Known Uncertainty 
To make use of the checklist from the previous section for hazard analysis, we introduce the 
multi-level causal relationship model and the HOT-PIE diagram, which we will elaborate in this 
section. 
 
Multi-level causal relationship model.  Causal relationships can be presented at many different 
levels of abstraction. Hence, we have adopted the Coleman’s boat of causal pathways [15, 36] in our 
model so as to capture the causal relationships at multiple levels of abstraction (see Figure 1a). 
Coleman’s model considers causation at the macro and micro level, which are commonly applied in 
the social and biological domains. For example, in biology, some scientists may work at the macro-
ecosystem level (e.g. between human and animals) which can be highly abstract. Other scientists may 
work at the micro-organism level such as investigating organs and cells in the circulatory system. 
 
 
Figure 1 Using Coleman’s boat of causal pathway to capture causal relationships 
We can apply a similar concept when we identify safety-critical causal relationships. For 
example, in Figure 1b, we describe at the macro level that social factors can influence technology. We 
can be more precise by drilling down to the micro-level in order to show evidence of the influence of 
social factor on technology. One such evidence could be the lack of staffing (which is a social factor) 
that prevents the proper operation of the machine (which is a technological issue). 
 
Figure 2 Representing Causal Relationships in Hazard Analysis 
In our multi-level causal relationship model, we consider that a macro-level causal relationship 
between two objects exists when a causal factor related to one object affects a causal factor of another 
object. At the micro-level, these causal factors are link to each other via one or more causal paths. 
These causal paths are similar to the “action-formation mechanisms” under the Coleman’s model. 
a) Extracted from Coleman’s boat of causal pathways b) Example  
Multi-level Causal Relationship Model Example 
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These causal paths provide the narrative or instantiation of how objects can influence each other. Our 
causal model is shown on the left in Figure 2 and an example to illustrate the model is provided on the 
right.  
In this example, the two objects are “the engineer” and “the repair and recovery function”, where 
the former is expected to perform the latter. With reference to Table 1, we analyse a causal factor 
under the engineer (human) and a causal factor for the repair and recovery function (process) to 
identify a causal path (the level of expertise) that can potentially be safety-critical. In other words, we 
claim that the lack of expertise from the engineer in carrying out the process of repair and recovery 
may become a hazard. We can make use of Table 1 to search for other plausible causal paths between 
“the engineer” and “the repair and recovery function” that may be safety-critical, such as 
“complacency” and “performance slip”.    
 
HOT-PIE diagram.  Next, we introduce the HOT-PIE diagram. We have earlier defined six 
causal factors: Human, Organisation, Technology, Process, Information and Environment. A hexagon 
is used to represent these six factors that could influence or be influenced by another object. We call it 
a HOT-PIE diagram and is based on the first letter from each of the six causal factors (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 HOT-PIE diagram to represent causal factors affecting an object 
An arrow connecting the vertices of two objects represents a causal path where possible safety-
critical causal relationship can be derived. Back to the earlier example, the lack of expertise by the 
engineer in carrying out the repair and recovery function can be represented graphically using the 
HOT-PIE diagram. The engineer and the repair and recovery function are considered as objects, while 
the lack of expertise is considered as a causal path linking both objects (Figure 4).   
  
 
Figure 4 Different ways of representing causal relationships 
Although the hexagonal representation in the HOT-PIE diagram may resemble the FRAM 
diagram [11], the foci of the two models are different. FRAM focuses on functional behaviour of a 
system and the hexagon in a FRAM diagram represents the six aspects of a function (time, control, 
input, output, resource and precondition). In contrast, our HOT-PIE diagram represents the six 
Multi-level Causal Relationship HOT-PIE 
diagram 
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potential causal factors that can influence different objects and the vertices are linked by potential 
causal paths. While FRAM is used to analyse functions, the HOT-PIE diagram can be applied to 
multiple system models, such as functional, structural and behavioural.  
The HOT-PIE diagram is useful when one wants to capture causal paths between system objects, 
such as from a design document during a hazard analysis. The diagram is simple to understand as it is 
based on the six causal factors. It also presents an easy way to document potential causal paths 
between objects. Even if we are not confident enough to conclude that a causal path is indeed safety-
critical, we can still capture the potential causal path easily for future analysis when the relevant 
information is available.  
 
3.3. Process to Augment Hazard Analysis Technique   
Instead of a separate standalone method to conduct safety assessment, our approach aims to 
incorporate the considerations of epistemic uncertainty through augmenting existing hazard analysis 
techniques such as the STPA
1
 [37] 
and FMEA
2
 [38]. By introducing 
complimentary steps to existing 
analysis, we make the safety 
assessment more complete through 
recognising the influence of 
uncertainty on safety-critical causal 
paths. Our checklist of causal paths 
helps stakeholders to recognise 
potential causal relationships and 
the HOT-PIE model can be used to 
consider the various causal factors 
related to each object. The desired 
outcome is to recognise unknown uncertainties, capture them as know uncertainties and track them 
throughout the system lifecycle. We summarise the three steps in Figure 5. 
Step 1: Recognise Definite and Plausible Causal Relationships.  With the help of the causal 
paths checklist, we aim to recognise previously unknown causal relationships affecting the STS. Some 
of these may turn up to be safety-critical and considered as hazards. Others may not be considered as 
safety-critical during the analysis due to uncertainty (e.g. not knowing if the eventual engineer doing 
the runway repair has the necessary training and qualification). Instead of considering all causal 
relationships the same, we differentiate those that are plausible-but-uncertain from those that are more 
definite. For causal relationships that are specific and definite, we can immediately make use of them 
as evidence during hazard analysis. On the other hand, for those plausible-but-uncertain causal 
relationships, we want to capture them for future analysis. 
Step 2: Evaluate New Information Affecting Uncertainty.  We have earlier mentioned that 
uncertainty can evolve and hence, it is important for us to track it. Some uncertainties will become 
clearer with time, such as the availability of test result, confirmation of the actual engineer for the 
runway repair and the availability of interface specifications of yet to be developed component. Such 
relevant information will enable us to make better judgement about safety risk, albeit at a later phase 
                                                     
1
 STPA (Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis) is a hazard analysis technique based on Systems Theory. 
2
 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is an inductive reasoning technique for hazard analysis. 
Figure 5 Tracking of epistemic uncertainty through existing hazard 
analysis technique 
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of the system lifecycle. To enable this, we need to rigorously track uncertainties till the relevant 
information is available down the lifecycle. We want to encourage stakeholders to defer judgement on 
potentially safety-critical causal relationships, rather than always discard them, as we may not fully 
appreciate their influence in a complicated STS at the point where we first considered them.  
Step 3: Enable Through-life Tracking.  We see potential of through-life tracking by 
complementing current safety case development. A safety case is a “structured argument, supported by 
a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for 
a given application in a given operating environment” [39]. Safety cases have been widely adopted 
across many industries including defence, aerospace, automobile and railways. While a safety case 
provides a systematic structure to capture arguments that may concern epistemic uncertainty, it is 
often conducted at the tail end of a system development, during deployment or operation. At this 
point, the developing system cannot be readily modified in response to the new safety concerns. We 
have mentioned that epistemic uncertainties are common and unavoidable throughout the system 
lifecycle. For example, there could be design documents with uncertainties about operational concepts 
and requirements. These are not considered in safety cases if they are not developed right from the 
design phase. Hence, it is sensible to extend safety case to early design and track it through the 
lifecycle. Our approach of tracking epistemic uncertainty will be useful to complement such dynamic 
safety case development by incrementally tracking the impact of uncertainty. In the next section, we 
will show with an example how through-life capturing and tracking of causal paths can lead to better 
assurance later in the system lifecycle.  
4. Applicability of Our Approach 
We present three examples to assess the applicability of our approach. First, we analyse different 
types of system model to 
identify if there are causal 
factors that are not 
apparent in each model. 
We have chosen the U.K. 
Ministry of Defence 
Architectural Framework 
(MoDAF) for our analysis 
as it is widely used for 
system development. 
Secondly, we have also 
reviewed an existing 
safety assessment example 
to determine if our 
recommended process 
could be incorporated in 
the analysis. We have chosen the Aircraft System analysis in ARP-4761 [40] as the guideline is 
considered an acceptable means of establishing assurance process for aircraft system. In our last 
example, we use the STPA process to illustrate the feasibility of integrating our approach into existing 
hazard analysis technique.  
Views to be 
analysed 
Figure 6 Summary of MoDAF viewpoints 
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4.1. Ministry of Defence Architectural Framework (MoDAF)  
MoDAF is a commonly used architectural framework that comprises multiple models or views to 
describe a military STS. The type and category of viewpoints are extracted from the MoDAF 
handbook[41] and presented in Figure 6. As hazards are mostly identified at the operational and 
system perspectives, we have correspondingly narrowed our analysis to operational and system 
viewpoints. In addition, we have also focused on the structural and behavioural categories as they are 
the more common models that are used for hazard analysis. Hence, we have narrowed our analysis on 
five operational views (OV-2, 4, 5, 6 and 7) and five system views (SV-1, 2, 4, 10 and 11) as 
highlighted in Figure 6. For each of the ten views, we analyse the type of data objects that can be 
represented and compared them with the six causal factors we have defined: Human, Organisation, 
Technology, Process, Information and Environment. We want to analyse the extent that causal factors 
are being considered in each view.  
As an illustration, 
consider SV-1 (System View 
1 – Resource Interaction 
Specification). SV-1 specifies 
the composition and 
interaction of resources, 
which can be physical 
artefacts, software or human 
resources. The key data 
objects related to SV-1 are 
extracted from the MoDAF 
handbook and shown in 
Figure 7. Using this 
information, we analysis if 
each causal factor and its 
associated causal paths are 
being considered by the data 
objects. The observation is 
summarised in Table 2. We 
have observed that 
organisation, technology and information causal factors are mostly represented in SV-1, while 
environmental factors are not. In addition, human factors are only partially represented as although 
SV-1 can show manpower deployment, it does not represent human mental states. Process factors are 
also partially represented as SV-1, being a structural model, needs a corresponding process model (e.g. 
SV-4) to better represent causal paths related to processes.    
 
 
Table 2 Extent of representing causal factors in MoDAF SV-1 
Figure 7 SV-1 Resource Interaction Specification 
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We have carried out similar analysis for the remaining 9 operational and system views (see Table 
3). From the table, we can observe the following: 
1. Different causal factors and causal paths are better represented by different views.  
2. Environment related causal factors are not explicitly represented in most of the views. 
3. Even if a type of causal factor is described in a view, not all the causal paths related to a 
causal factor are considered. For example, human related causal paths are so wide that 
not one view can fully represent all of them. 
 
 
Table 3 Extent of representing causal factors in MoDAF operational and system views 
From our analysis of the MoDAF views, we conclude that none of the individual views can 
represent all the causal factors. This means that each view does not allow the user to fully comprehend 
the danger posed by every causal factor during hazard analysis. For example, using a system structural 
view (SV-1) may not help to identify the hazards associated with human behaviour. Similarly, a 
concept of operation under the operational activity model (OV-5) will not be able to surface 
organisation issues such as training or manpower constraints.  
Our approach of managing uncertainty in causal relationships can complement MoDAF by 
highlighting causal factors and causal paths that are potentially safety-critical. The HOT-PIE model 
can help to sieve out unknown uncertainties which may not be obvious in each of the MoDAF views. 
These causal paths can be used either to compare with other MoDAF views or for future hazard 
analysis. 
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4.2. ARP-4761 – Aircraft System Analysis  
SAE ARP-4761 is an industrial standard for conducting safety assessment process to certify civil 
aircraft. It includes a worked example of a typical safety assessment process for a fictitious aircraft 
design. We have studied this example to assess whether our approach could be integrated into it.  
We focus on the aircraft functional hazard analysis (FHA) as it is one of the safety processes 
where we identify hazards. There are many aircraft functions to be investigated and we have narrowed 
our analysis to the ‘Decelerate aircraft on the ground’ function. That is the ability of the aircraft to 
decelerate and stop safely when it touches down on the runway. In the example, the following possible 
failure conditions and assumptions related to the aircraft were determined (see Table 4). 
Functional Failure Conditions:  
a. Loss of all deceleration 
capability 
b. Reduced deceleration capability 
c. Inadvertent deceleration 
d. Loss of all auto stopping 
features 
e. Asymmetrical Deceleration 
Environmental and Emergency 
Configurations and Conditions  
a. Runway conditions (wet, icy, etc.)  
b. Runway length  
c. Tail/Cross wind  
d. Engine out  
e. Hydraulic System Loss  
f. Electrical system loss  
Applicable Phases:  
a. Taxi  
b. Takeoff to rotation  
c. Landing Roll  
d. Rejected takeoff 
(RTO) 
Interfacing 
Functions:  
a. Air/Ground 
Determinations 
b. Crew Alerting 
(Crew warnings, 
alerts, messages) 
Table 4 Aircraft system failure conditions and assumptions 
Applying our Approach to the Aircraft System Analysis. During the FHA, the aircraft 
function tree was used in the analysis (see Figure 8). This is analogous to the SV-4 view (system 
functional description) in a MoDAF model. We can refer to Table 3 and find out where are the 
possible causal factors that may not be obvious in such a functional representation. From the row in 
Table 3 that describes a SV-4 view, we can generally expect that human, organisation and 
environment factors will not be well represented in an aircraft function tree.    
We have identified five top-level objects 
for the aircraft system analysis: aircrew, ground 
crew, aircraft technical systems, runway and the 
environment. Next, we apply the HOT-PIE 
causal factors on these objects to search for 
potential causal paths. Using the HOT-PIE 
diagram and referencing the checklist of causal 
paths, we have identified three interesting causal 
paths that are important to the aircraft system 
analysis but are not obvious in the ARP-4761 
example (see Figure 9). Details of the causal 
paths are given in Table 5.  
 
CP1 Causal Factors: Human (aircrew), Process (a/c tech system) 
Causal Path: Distraction 
Scenario: Pilot may be distracted due to bad practices during the deceleration process. 
CP2 Causal Factors: Environment (environment), Technology (a/c tech system) 
Causal Path: Adverse weather - hydroplaning 
Scenario: Wet runway may cause hydroplaning in the autobrake system, which may result in the autobrake 
sensor not detecting aircraft touchdown condition. 
CP3 Causal Factors: Organisation (ground crew), Process (runway) 
Causal Path: Inadequate training for runway emergency management 
Scenario: Unsure if adequate training has been provided to the ground crews (e.g. air traffic controllers, ground 
logistics team, ground runway emergency team) in preparation for adverse weather operation and emergency. 
Table 5 Potential Causal paths between aircraft system objects 
Figure 8 Example of aircraft functions 
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CP1 (distraction) and CP2 (hydroplaning) are 
safety-critical, and they can directly affect the aircraft 
design. They should be fed back into the FHA and 
treated as potential hazards for follow-up safety 
assessment. CP3 concerns the qualification of ground 
crews in handling emergency during operation. During 
the high level aircraft FHA, the team involves in the 
analysis may not have the relevant information 
regarding the ground crews and it may want to focus on 
issues directly related to the aircraft design. In our 
approach, we propose to consider CP3 as a plausible-
but-uncertain causal relationship. This shall be tracked 
through the lifecycle as long as we are uncertain if it is 
safety-critical. There could be many ways that CP3 can 
evolve as we gain more knowledge about the quality of 
training for the ground crews. For example, there may 
eventually be confirmation that the ground crews subscribe to the standardised ICAO Global Runway 
Safety Programme. If so, CP3 will not be of safety concern. Alternatively, it may be revealed during 
the system validation phase that the procedure used by the ground crew for emergency handling is 
different from that being used by the pilot. This can become a potential hazard affecting the aircraft 
landing. 
 
4.3. Augmenting existing STPA Hazard Analysis  
 
Figure 10 Augmenting STPA with HOT-PIE approach 
Figure 9 HOT-PIE diagram for aircraft system analysis 
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As mentioned in section 3.3, we are not proposing a separate standalone method to conduct 
safety assessment but rather introduce additional steps within the existing hazard analysis techniques. 
In this section, we illustrate the use of our approach to augment the STPA process. 
Figure 10 shows how our approach can integrate with STPA (details of the original STPA 
process is described in the STPA primer [37]). On the left are the three key steps in STPA. Our HOT-
PIE approach can be introduced in the first two STPA steps to identify uncertainties among the safety 
control structure, unsafe control actions and control flaws. STPA requires that a system design be 
available; using our approach, stakeholders can reference this system design as a basis to identify 
causal paths concerning the six primarily HOT-PIE causal factors. Causal paths discovered from using 
the HOT-PIE checklist that are definite to be safety-critical will be fed back to the STPA process. 
Causal paths that the stakeholders may not know enough due to uncertainty would be documented as 
findings under the STPA process.  
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we have outlined an approach to managing epistemic uncertainty in existing hazard 
analysis by creating a technique for recognising unknown uncertainty and developing a model to 
systematically capture known uncertainty. To assess the applicability of our approach, we have 
analysed the widely-used MoDAF architectural framework and determined that there is potential for 
our approach to identify additional causal factors that are not apparent from individual MoDAF views. 
We have also reviewed a portion of the ARP4761 Aircraft System FHA example and determined that 
our approach could indeed be incorporated into a process like that. To further demonstrate its 
practicality, we have integrated our approach into STPA hazard analysis technique. It is reasonable to 
conclude that our approach can increase the safety assurance during hazard analysis in the face of 
epistemic uncertainty. 
Our model provides a systematic approach to consider the effect of multiple causal paths 
affecting the safety of complicated system. By creating the awareness of what we know and what we 
don’t know, it encourages stakeholders to be disciplined and explicit about the level of information 
and uncertainty encountered during hazard analysis. Our approach highlights (1) causal paths that are 
considered openly during the hazard analysis, (2) causal paths that are considered intrinsically, which 
may not be visible in existing hazard analysis techniques, and (3) causal paths that are unknown 
initially.  
By advocating the capture of plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships, we have created the 
flexibility to defer part of the hazard analysis. This is possible by tracking the known uncertainties for 
future assessment till the relevant information is available. It may well be that the HOT-PIE approach 
reveals that certain form of causal interactions cannot yet be revealed, given the extent of the 
knowledge available at this point of the lifecycle. Our approach allows us to appreciate this 
incompleteness when augmenting existing hazard analysis techniques. We believe that this provides 
better assurance than an approach which claims undue confidence that we can know for sure the 
severity and criticality of a hazard, especially in early life cycle. 
One extant concern is how well the HOT-PIE model can scale to larger systems with many 
objects and causal paths. One possible research area concerning large-scale application of HOT-PIE 
approach is to automate the process of capturing the causal factors (e.g. input into a spreadsheet via a 
user form). Another follow-on task is to derive criteria to assess the significance of introducing our 
approach to existing hazard analysis. Potential criteria include the number of safety-critical causal 
paths identified and the number of additional steps needed in the analysis when using our approach.  
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We have briefly discussed our efforts to integrate with safety case development. One option is to 
track causal paths as safety artefacts (e.g. evidence and arguments), which are familiar terms in safety 
case development. Using the work by Hawkins [42] on confidence argument, it may be possible to 
incorporate epistemic uncertainty in confidence arguments. This will help to support through-life 
tracking of safety assurance case during system development. 
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